Adam Carter
(2010-2019)
X(2013). Extended cognition and epistemic luck. Synthese, 190 (18), 4201-4214. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0267-3.
with Jarvis Benjamin, Rubin Katherine (2013). Knowledge and the value of cognitive ability. Synthese, 190 (17), 3715-3729. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0220-x.
with Gordon Emma C (2014). A new maneuver against the epistemic relativist. Synthese, 191 (8), 1683-1695. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0357-2.
with Jarvis Benjamin, Rubin Katherine (2016). Belief without credence. Synthese, 193 (8), 2323-2351. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0846-6.
(2017). Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy. Synthese, 194 (5), 1463-1476. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0766-5.
with Collin James H., Palermos Spyridon Orestis (2017). Semantic inferentialism as (a form of) active externalism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 16 (3), 387-402. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9458-y.
with Peterson Martin (2017). The modal account of luck revisited. Synthese, 194 (6), 2175-2184. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1047-7.
(2018). Meta-epistemic defeat. Synthese, 195 (7), 2877-2896. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1187-9.
with Pritchard Duncan (2018). Extended self-knowledge. In P. Pedrini & J. Kirsch (eds.) Third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative (pp. 31-49). Dordrecht: Springer.
with McKenna Robin (2019). Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge. Synthese, 196 (12), 4989-5007. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1689-8.