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(2000) Synthese 124 (1).
Quineans have taken the basic expression of ontological commitment to be an assertion of the form '∃ x φ', assimilated to theEnglish 'there is something that is a φ'. Here I take the existential quantifier to be introduced, not as an abbreviation for an expression of English, but via Tarskian semantics. I argue, contrary to the standard view, that Tarskian semantics in fact suggests a quite different picture: one in which quantification is of a substitutional type apparently first proposed by Geach. The ontological burden is borne by constant symbols, and truth is defined separately from reference.
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Full citation:
Lavine, S. (2000). Quantification and ontology. Synthese 124 (1), pp. 1-43.
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