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(2007) Synthese 156 (1).
In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis’ Modal Realism is unobtainable. I consider two familiar objections to Lewisian realism – the modal irrelevance objection and the epistemological objection – and argue that Lewis’ response to each is unsatisfactory because they presuppose claims that only the Lewisian realist will accept. Since, I argue, warrant for Lewisian realism can only be obtained if we have a response to each objection that does not presuppose the truth of Lewisian realism, this circularity is vicious. I end by contrasting Lewis’ methodology with Forrest’s in order to illustrate a rival method that does not fall victim to the objection I lay against Lewis.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-005-2003-0
Full citation:
Ross, C. (2007). Lewisian realism: methodology, epistemology, and circularity. Synthese 156 (1), pp. 143-159.
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