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(2013) Synthese 190 (16).
Rachel Briggs’ critique of “antirealist” accounts of scientific law— including my own perspectivalist best-system account—is part of a project meant to show that Humean conceptions of scientific law are more problematic than has been commonly realized. Indeed, her argument provides a new challenge to the Humean, a thoroughly epistemic version of David Lewis’ “big, bad bug” for Humeanism. Still, I will argue, the antirealist (perspectivalist and expressivist) accounts she criticizes have the resources to withstand the challenge and come out stronger for it. Attention to epistemic possibilities, I argue, shows a number of advantages to a perspectivalist account of scientific law.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0202-z
Full citation:
Halpin, J. (2013). Briggs on antirealist accounts of scientific law. Synthese 190 (16), pp. 3439-3449.
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