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(2017) Synthese 194 (4).
The lottery paradox shows that the following three individually highly plausible theses are jointly incompatible: (i) highly probable propositions are justifiably believable, (ii) justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction, (iii) known contradictions are not justifiably believable. This paper argues that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox must reject (i) as versions of the paradox can be generated without appeal to either (ii) or (iii) and proposes a new solution to the paradox in terms of a novel account of justified believability.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0989-5
Full citation:
Kelp, C. (2017). Lotteries and justification. Synthese 194 (4), pp. 1233-1244.
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