Repository | Book | Chapter
(2016) A theory of philosophical fallacies, Dordrecht, Springer.
We come back to the question why the logical method of rigorous logical inferences that works so well in geometry cannot be used in philosophy. Philosophical concepts are already in place before we begin philosophising, so that any attempt at defining them ends up in concept-swapping, i.e. replacing the original concept with a different and arbitrary one. Whenever philosophers do that, they equivocate. This fallacy is often compounded with circular definitions.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-20783-4_13
Full citation:
Nelson, L. (2016). Lecture XII, in A theory of philosophical fallacies, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 109-116.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.