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Aristotle was quite correct in teaching that our knowledge of time comes from our knowledge of motion and change of things and that we can have absolutely no sense of time without sensing some motion; that is, unless we perceive or remember some motion. But it appears that from these premises he incorrectly inferred that time does not exist without motion. But why should time depend on the motion of things and why in the absence of motion and change should it likewise cease to exist and to flow, when it exists by itself when no motion and no change are present? Likewise it was not correct for him to declare that, since we always perceive time and motion together — never time without motion nor motion without time — time is a kind of state or affection of motion. For even had motion no affinity or relationship whatever with time and time none with it, being both completely distinct from one another; since every motion and change takes place in time, and time manifests to us its brevity or length, and no time elapses in which we would not perceive or remember some motion, it is necessarily the case that wherever we sense any motion — since we also sense its duration — we are likewise aware of time in which it takes place. Therefore the fact that we always perceive them together is no reason for claiming that one of them is the essence (quid) of the other; but only, what seems to be the case, namely that every motion occurs in its own time and that no motion can take place without time. This is the only sense in which their mutual affinity and relationship should be and is understood.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-1727-5_32

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