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An intrinsic property of an object is intuitively understood as the property which the object can have independent of all other objects. The notion of an intrinsic property figures prominently in the debates over consciousness. One of the arguments for the rejection of traditional physicalism—the thesis that all reality, including qualia, are physical—has been the claim that physical properties are merely extrinsic or relational, while qualia are intrinsic. What does it mean for a property to be intrinsic, and why do not physical properties qualify as intrinsic? This chapter is an attempt to make sense of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. It looks at two attempts at precisely defining an intrinsic property, and at an argument for epistemic humility—the thesis that we have no knowledge of intrinsic properties at all. It shall be argued that one exception can be made to the humility thesis—qualia. The qualia-as-intrinsic thesis is likely to have significant implications for various debates in philosophy of mind, and metaphysics, of which two shall be explored here. It shall be argued that given this thesis: (i). Combination of experiences is not possible. If one further assumes ontological monism, this thesis leads us to the conclusion that all entities are simples—such that they cannot be divided (ii). Relational properties are not reducible to intrinsic properties.

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