Repository | Book | Chapter
(2015) Essays on Gödel's reception of Leibniz, Husserl and Brouwer, Dordrecht, Springer.
Hintikka has claimed that Gödel did not believe in possible worlds and that the actualism this induces is the motivation behind his Platonism. I argue that Hintikka is wrong about what Gödel believed, and that, moreover, there exists a phenomenological unification of Gödel's Platonism and possible worlds theory. This text was written for a special issue of Axiomathes on the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann, which explains the two introductory paragraphs.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-10031-9_7
Full citation:
Van Atten, M. (2015). Gödel, mathematics, and possible worlds, in Essays on Gödel's reception of Leibniz, Husserl and Brouwer, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 147-155.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.