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(2014) Mind, values, and metaphysics II, Dordrecht, Springer.
This chapter examines whether there are genuine cases of aesthetic perception, and hence whether aesthetic judgements depend on the perception of aesthetic properties. My response will be negative. Specifically, I will argue that although our access to aesthetic "properties' does appear to resemble perception in certain respects, it differs in two key ways from cases of ordinary everyday perception: (a) in its opacity (i.e. its lacking transparency) and (b) in its partly nonattributive phenomenology.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_7
Full citation:
Todd, C. (2014)., Why we do not perceive aesthetic properties, in A. Reboul (ed.), Mind, values, and metaphysics II, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 105-116.
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