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(1990) Wittgenstein — eine neubewertung/Wittgenstein — towards a re-evaluation, Dordrecht, Springer.

Necessary identity and necessary existence

Timothy Williamson

pp. 168-175

Queen Anne is dead. That sentence expresses a truth; it does so because its subject term refers to someone — Queen Anne — who satisfies its predicate, and therefore — if death is the end of existence — no longer exists. But then what is left for "Queen Anne' to refer to?

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-30086-2_15

Full citation:

Williamson, T. (1990)., Necessary identity and necessary existence, in R. Haller & J. L. Brandl (eds.), Wittgenstein — eine neubewertung/Wittgenstein — towards a re-evaluation, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 168-175.